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Good evening. 
 
1. It is an honour for me to be invited to share ideas with you regarding 
my perspectives and insights into conflict resolution in Africa. I have 
approached this subject by first providing the background to contemporary 
peace building processes in Africa with the objective to bring about a new 
political dispensation in certain countries.  
 
2. Such initiatives include my role as the Facilitator for the Inter-
Congolese National Dialogue that resulted in the current Transitional 
Government, and expected to lead to free and fair elections in the DRC. I 
will then conclude my address with some lessons leant, which I believe they 
contribute to the body of knowledge on conflict resolution in general.   
 
3. Over the past few decades, Africa has probably suffered more from 
war than any other continent. Since the 1960’s when many African countries 
attained independence, several million lives were lost, and several million 
people became refugees as a result of conflicts. This is not a record that we 
can be proud of. The tragic Rwandan genocide in 1994 will forever remain 
one of the darkest pages in our history.  
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4. Furthermore, thousands of children are increasingly involved in 
conflicts as child soldiers, in direct violation of the International Convention 
on the Rights of the Child. There are many causes for these conflicts, namely 
poverty, social inequality and injustice, impunity and the violation of 
fundamental human rights.  
 
5. African states, including my own country Botswana, have had to 
make many sacrifices in order to resolve conflicts and promote peace and 
security. There have been multilateral interventions by African states in 
Somali, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, the 
Central African Republic, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Such 
interventions were enormously costly and they highlighted our continent's 
weak financial and military resource base.  
 
6. Against this background, I support the view that it is important the 
United Nations remains the main body in charge of conflict resolution 
throughout the world, and that the world body assume its global 
responsibilities in seeking solutions to these conflicts. Furthermore, African 
states emerging from conflicts must also confront the issue of reconciliation 
and justice. It is important that we negotiate political compromises that give 
all involved parties reasons for preferring peace to war. 
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7.  Implementing systems of government that protect human rights and 
the interests of all parties must be more the rule than the exception. The 
reintegration of faction fighters and child soldiers into local communities is 
also a vital task of post-conflict reconstruction and peace building. We must 
find a balance between the demand for equitable justice and moral and 
material retribution for the victims of atrocities, on the one hand, and the 
need to create conditions for peace and stability, on the other hand. We must 
determine the most appropriate vehicles for achieving these goals.  
 
8. Against this background, I will now discuss the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue, based on the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement, as an essential 
prerequisite for peace and security in the DRC. The Lusaka Agreement 
stipulated that the Government of the DRC, the armed opposition -- namely 
the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the Movement for the 
Liberation of the Congo (MLC) -- as well as the unarmed opposition enter 
into an open national dialogue. It was then hoped that this would lead to a 
new political dispensation with national reconciliation.  
 
9. The DRC has witnessed over three decades of Mobutism, 
characterised by political and economic bad governance with the result of a 
decadent state, crisis of legitimacy, widespread dissidence and armed 
rebellion. Its location in the centre of Africa made the DRC a key player in 
the region. Relations with surrounding countries have often been driven by 
security concerns. Conflicts in Angola, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and 
Sudan, have at various times created tensions between the DRC and its 
neighbours.  
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10. Since 1996, conflicts have wrought havoc amongst the population of 
the DRC. The scale of the conflict, numbers of killed and displaced 
populations, the number of countries involved, and the role of DRC’s natural 
resources in fuelling the conflict have led some analysts to refer to it as 
Africa’s First World War. Therefore, the Lusaka Cease-fire Agreement 
was hailed as the only internationally recognised framework for durable 
peace and national reconciliation in the DRC.  
 
11. Unfortunately, despite the signing of the Lusaka Cease-fire 
Agreement the war continued. Violations of the agreement persisted. This 
reduced the momentum of the peace process. Therefore, my mission as the 
Facilitator for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue was a very difficult one. The 
peace negotiation process also faced another crucial obstacle. The Dialogue 
did not take place within the stipulated period of 45 days after the signing of 
the Agreement in 1999. Lack of political will by all parties involved in the 
conflict, and inadequate funds to finance the various aspects of this process, 
were the major stumbling blocks. 
 
12. The Dialogue formally started 2 years after the date stipulated in the 
Agreement. The process was continuously interrupted. The Dialogue was 
beset with many challenges and obstacles. After the opening ceremony the 
Plenary Meeting could not take place because of the absence of the MLC 
delegation in Sun City. The President of the MLC rejected the presence of 
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certain representatives of the political opposition and withheld his delegation 
until his objection was dealt with.  
 
 
13. After twelve days of pleading and bargaining, the matter was resolved 
and the Plenary resumed. However, after only three days of the resumption 
of negotiations, the Government of the DRC withdrew its delegation from 
the dialogue. The Government stated reason was that its forces had come 
under attack from the soldiers of the Rwandan soldiers who had crossed into 
the DRC territory. 
 
 
 
 
14. In order to address this problem I dispatched concurrent missions to 
several African Heads of State for conditions to be created, not only for the 
dialogue to resume, but also for there to be concerted multilateral action by 
the signatories of the Lusaka Cease- fire Agreement on the withdrawal of 
foreign forces from the DRC. I also communicated with the UN Security 
Council to exert the necessary diplomatic and political pressure on the 
relevant governments to respect and support the peace negotiation process. 
 
15. In spite of these set backs, eventually, progress was achieved. 
Bringing the Congolese together to talk, after so many years of fighting 
among themselves, was in itself a significant achievement. Finally, overall 
37 resolutions arising from the negotiations were adopted, ranging from 
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issues pertaining to peace, reconciliation and socio- economic reconstruction 
in the Congo, to humanitarian issues, and issues of defence and security 
structures. By April 2003 the Inter-Congolese Dialogue accomplished all 
that was expected of it. 
 
16. As of now, efforts are continuing under the auspices of the 
international community -- the United Nations, the African Union and 
Southern African Development Community -- to assist the Congolese to 
hold free and fair elections in order to elect a representative government. 
 
17. What lesson have we learned from the DRC crisis? These are 
many. But I will confine myself to only a few at this moment. 
 
 
 
18. On the domestic level, one can say that the security of any regime is 
linked, in the long term, to the democratic and economic governance of the 
country and security of the population. The challenge of running the State 
effectively goes beyond developing physical infrastructures and putting the 
police on the streets. It is imperative that regimes build strong 
institutions for participatory democracy and good governance to meet 
people’s legitimate expectations. 
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19. Confidence building among the antagonists must be an important 
aspect of the peace negotiation process. Problems of insecurity can be 
alleviated if the parties understand that their adversaries will have an 
opportunity to reciprocate their actions the next time they meet. Thus, my 
facilitation process involved a lot of separate meetings with different parties 
-- before and during the negotiations -- in an attempt to create a conducive 
environment for the parties to meet and discuss. 
 
 
20. The peace process must involve the smallest number of players. 
Conflicts involving numerous actors, many of which continue to emerge as 
rebel groups factionalise, can be difficult to resolve. In such situations, the 
large number of actors means that one is frequently facing new actors, and 
opportunities to establish trust are minimized. Unfortunately, because of lack 
of trust of one another in the DRC, an all inclusive Inter-Congolese Dialogue 
was unavoidable. 
 
 
21. Confidence is best developed under existing political structures. 
Degrees of state collapse range from weakened or illegitimate governments 
(in the Sudan for example) to near or outright state failure (for example, 
Sierra Leone, Liberia or Somalia). Where anarchy undermines the likelihood 
of stable interaction between antagonists, prospects for peace may be 
improved as its effects are minimized. Ideally, peace processes need to be 
conducted under a coherent indigenous state structure rather than the chaos 
of a collapsed state. 
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22. Critical resources must be forthcoming. The establishment of 
confidence comes not just from the presence of a stabilizing force but the 
execution of the peace process itself. The confidence of warring parties is 
contingent on the prompt arrival of a peacekeeping force and the provision 
of resources to meet obligations. Otherwise the failure to follow through on 
promises made to demobilize factions can undermine confidence in the 
peacekeepers and the peace process in general. 
 
 
23. The parties to the negotiations must have confidence in mediators 
and peacekeepers. Confidence building involves not only the establishment 
of trust between adversaries but also, and perhaps more importantly, its 
establishment between mediators and local parties. Parties see their survival 
as dependent on their continued possession of weaponry and the even-
handed execution of the peace process. Disarmament or other risky elements 
of a settlement requires them to place enormous trust in those overseeing the 
peace process. 
 
 
24. Finally, the attributes of the persons entrusted with the task of 
presiding over the peace process, their nationality, or the organization they 
affiliated to, must be beyond reproach.  Such persons should be people of 
integrity and honesty, be clear-minded and strong of character, without 
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being overbearing. They should be respected for their personal qualities as 
well as for their actual political attainments. 
 
25. Ladies and Gentlemen, I thank you for your interest. I would be happy 
to answer any question that you may have. 
